A Closer Look at State v. Cobb and DWI Checkpoints in North Carolina

Obviously, some DWI checkpoints were creatively, and purposely, entitled "license checks" for a reason. Some might consider the exercise a less than intellectually honest effort to avoid the complexities associated with a DWI checkpoint vis-à-vis statutory and constitutional considerations.

Trial courts rarely, if ever, encountered license checkpoints set up from Monday through Friday, 7:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.

License checkpoints were common in areas of town in close proximity to alcohol-serving restaurants and bars, especially on Friday and Saturday nights, during the hours immediately before and after 2:00 a.m., which not so coincidentally is when bars close under the ABC laws.

One would reasonably conclude, at least in part, that's why the Rose and Veazey Courts made some effort to explain that it doesn't much matter what you call the checkpoint, roadblock, or checking station in answering the age-old question, "Are DUI checkpoints legal?"

The legal issues under North Carolina law, to some degree, involve a heightened degree of inquiry.

Most notably, that is because unlike almost any other Chapter 20 enforcement action, or truly any other criminal investigation, there is neither Reasonable Suspicion of criminal activity afoot nor Probable Cause.

Checkpoints intrude on the rights of all citizens, whether or not they have exhibited reasonably suspicious behavior.

The law generally requires reasonable and individualized suspicion of criminal activity to effectuate a seizure or stop.

However, one type of exception to the general rule is when an individual is pulled over or “seized” during a checkpoint or roadblock.

Roadblocks were first expressly authorized under North Carolina General Statutes in 1983 when the legislature passed the Safe Roads Act.

The Safe Roads Act overhauled North Carolina’s existing Driving While Impaired statutes and added additional provisions including the statutory authority to conduct and regulate roadblocks and checkpoints.

The present statute governing the implementation of roadblocks is found under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.3A.

Whenever a defendant is charged with a criminal offense as a result of being stopped during a checkpoint, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is implicated for purposes of analysis.

When a Defendant challenges the Constitutionality of a checkpoint, Courts will (1) examine the evidence to determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program and (2) determine whether the checkpoint was reasonable. See State v. Rose, 170 N.C. App. 284 (2005).

The first inquiry into the primary purpose of the roadblock requires the Court to look at the roadblock at the “programmatic level” or determine whether the roadblock was carried out consistent with how it was planned.

Should the Court conclude that the roadblock was performed consistent with its primary purpose, they then determine whether the roadblock was reasonable using a balancing test of the government’s interest in conducting a checkpoint against the degree of intrusion to the individual.

To aid the Court in its determination, the Court considers a list of factors set out in Texas v. Brown, a United States Supreme Court case.

The factors include (1) the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure (2) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest (3) and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.

The determination is not as formulaic as it sounds and a considerable amount of discretion is given to the fact finder, but a checkpoint is deemed reasonable and constitutional if the factors weigh in favor of the public interest.

North Carolina courts have interpreted the Constitutionality of roadblocks using this framework for decades and the outcome in State v. Cobb demonstrates the continued use of the framework and an in-depth analysis regarding the reasonableness prong of the above test including the Brown factors.

In Cobb, the Defendant was charged with a DWI after being stopped at a checkpoint.

At trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol level arguing that the checkpoint was unconstitutional.

Specifically, defense counsel focused on the reasonableness of the checkpoint after conceding that the State had met its burden in proving the primary purpose of the checkpoint.

The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.

However, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

One Appellate Judge dissented which provided the vehicle for the State to appeal the Appellate Court’s decision.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the order of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.

The crux of the North Carolina Supreme Court opinion wrestles with the Brown factors stated above.

As to the first factor, the Court found that since the check point’s purpose was to check for driver’s licenses, “the public concerns served by the seizure outweigh the Fourth Amendment interest of individuals.”

Second, the Court found that the police appropriately tailored their checkpoint that advanced the public’s interest in detecting impaired drivers since law enforcement focused on a specific road that was a short distance from the highway where three county lines converge and only conducted stops between 12:15 – 2:00 AM.

Finally, the Court concluded that the “public interest served by the checking station outweighed the intrusion on defendant’s liberty interests.”

In support of this finding, the Court was persuaded by the fact that the officers did not have unfettered discretion in how to conduct the plan and that personnel (law enforcement officers/police officers) had limitations regarding the location and timeframe of the checkpoint.

In addition, all vehicles were stopped pursuant to the established plan and while “traffic did back up some,” it was “not extreme.”

Therefore, the Supreme Court opined the checkpoint was reasonable under the Fourth amendment.

While Cobb does not represent some grand departure from previous case law, the case is a good demonstration of the analytical process that the Court engages in to determine the constitutionality of checkpoints and illustrates that sobriety checkpoint cases are incredibly fact-specific requiring substantial scrutiny of the details.