Articles Tagged with North Carolina Court of Appeals

Warrantless DNA testing in North Carolina does not necessarily require police to obtain a new search warrant when the biological evidence was lawfully collected during an earlier investigation. In an August 5, 2026 opinion, State v. Howze, the North Carolina Court of Appeals approved DNA testing of a bloodstained shirt collected in 2016 and later used to connect the defendant to a 2019 murder, challenging the legality of the original seizure and resulting in a Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis.

DNA Evidence Issue What It Means in a North Carolina Criminal Case
How police obtained the DNA The analysis usually begins with how law enforcement came into possession of the biological material. A lawful warrant, consent, abandonment, plain view, statutory collection procedure, or another recognized legal basis may permit police to obtain evidence containing DNA.
DNA taken directly from your body A blood draw or cheek swab implicates constitutional protections because police are obtaining biological material directly from you. The legal authority for that collection should be examined separately from any later laboratory testing.
DNA on discarded property A cup, cigarette, bottle, straw, napkin, or similar item may contain DNA after it is discarded. Whether police may collect and test the item can depend on abandonment, where the property was left, and whether officers entered a constitutionally protected area to retrieve it.
DNA on lawfully seized property Clothing, weapons, vehicles, phones, and other physical evidence may contain blood, saliva, skin cells, hair, or other biological material. If police lawfully possess the item, later forensic testing may present a different constitutional question from the original seizure.
Testing evidence already in police possession Police may not necessarily need a new warrant merely because investigators later decide to conduct DNA testing on evidence they already lawfully possess. How the evidence originally came into government custody can therefore become key in a suppression analysis.
DNA from an older or unrelated investigation Biological evidence collected during one investigation may later become relevant to another investigation. The passage of time or the fact that the investigations are unrelated does not, by itself, determine whether later testing is lawful.
How long can police keep biological evidence? Evidence retention is a separate question from whether police can lawfully collect or test the evidence. The status of the investigation, preservation requirements, applicable statutes, and agency procedures may affect whether evidence must be retained, returned, destroyed, or removed from a database.
Challenging the original collection A defense lawyer may examine whether police had a lawful basis to obtain the item or sample, whether officers were lawfully present, whether they had lawful access, and whether the facts existing at the time justified the seizure.
Challenging the DNA testing Even when police lawfully obtained the evidence, DNA results might be challenged on the grounds of contamination, chain of custody, laboratory procedures, mixed samples, interpretation, statistical analysis, transfer, and other forensic issues.
What a DNA result actually proves A DNA “match” can help identify the source of biological material, but it does not necessarily establish when the material was deposited, how it arrived at a location, what activity produced it, or whether the person committed the charged offense.

State v. Howze is interesting in that the DNA evidence involved did not begin with a cheek swab, a discarded cup, an arrest-related DNA collection, or a search warrant directed toward the homicide being prosecuted.

It began with a bloody shirt.

In December 2016, J’Marius Howze went to a hospital after suffering a gunshot wound. A High Point police officer responded to investigate the shooting. The officer saw blood on Howze’s clothing and directed a crime-scene technician to collect the clothing as evidence. The investigation was never solved, and the shirt remained sealed in police evidence storage.

Several years later, High Point police were investigating the May 2019 shooting death of Cameron Owens. Investigators recovered a HiPoint nine-millimeter carbine rifle near the murder scene. Detective Buben located the shirt from Howze’s earlier shooting and submitted both the old clothing and swabs from the firearm to the State Crime Lab for DNA analysis. According to the opinion, the testing found Howze’s DNA on almost every sample submitted from the gun. That evidence became part of the probable-cause showing used to obtain a warrant for his arrest for first-degree murder.

Howze later moved to suppress the DNA evidence. His argument presented two distinct constitutional questions.

First, could police lawfully seize his clothing at the hospital in 2016?

Second, even if the shirt had been lawfully seized, could police years later analyze the biological material on it and use that DNA in an unrelated homicide investigation without obtaining another warrant?

The Court of Appeals answered both questions in favor of the State.

That second issue is what makes Howze somewhat interesting, at least from a factual basis.

Lawful Seizure of Evidence

Howze does not begin with the proposition that police can test whatever DNA happens to come into their possession. The Court must first determine whether law enforcement has lawfully obtained evidence from the outset.

In so doing, the State may rely on the longstanding plain-view doctrine.

A warrantless seizure may be permissible when an officer is lawfully situated to observe the evidence, the item’s evidentiary or incriminating character is immediately apparent, and the officer has lawful access to the object. North Carolina cases also recognize an inadvertence component to the plain-view analysis.

The phrase “immediately apparent” can, to some extent, be misleading. Police do not have to know with certainty precisely what later testing might reveal. Our appellate courts generally treat such issues as questions of probable cause.

It requires probable cause to believe that the item is evidence of criminal activity. That determination must be tied to the circumstances known at the time the item is seized, not to evidence discovered through later testing.

Officers responded to the hospital in 2016 after a reported shooting in which Mr. Howze and another man had been wounded. An officer observed Mr. Howze’s gunshot wound and bloodstained clothing while gathering information about that shooting. The Court of Appeals concluded that police had probable cause to treat the clothing as evidence of the firearm incident then being investigated. The clothing could contain blood or DNA from someone else, gunshot residue, hair, fibers, or other trace evidence bearing upon what had occurred.

The later 2019 murder presented a separate issue. DNA testing of biological material found on the lawfully seized shirt eventually connected Mr. Howze to an unrelated homicide. The court did not hold that police anticipated that connection when they seized the shirt. It held that the original seizure was lawful because the shirt had apparent evidentiary value in the shooting investigation, and that later forensic testing of lawfully obtained biological material did not constitute another search of Mr. Howze.

There is an interesting point buried in that analysis. The evidentiary justification supporting the original seizure and the investigative purpose of the later DNA testing were not the same. According to the Court of Appeals, however, the lawful seizure of the biological material eliminated Mr. Howze’s reasonable expectation of privacy in its subsequent forensic analysis.

That is the important legal issue. The State did not need probable cause in 2016 to believe the shirt connected Howze to the later murder in 2019. It needed probable cause to believe the shirt was evidence of the shooting police were investigating at the hospital. The court then treated the later DNA analysis as permissible secondary use of biological evidence already lawfully possessed.

Police Do Not Have Unlimited Access to Hospital Patients

If you are taken to a hospital after a shooting, a serious wreck, an assault, or a fight, there is a reasonable chance an officer will show up while you are still being treated. Most people assume that a treatment room is private space and that anything happening there stays between the patient and the medical staff. That assumption does not hold up in a criminal investigation. Hospital privacy rules govern what your doctors and nurses may disclose about your care. They do not turn a treatment area into a place officers can never enter, and they do not stop an officer from seeing what is in front of him.

That distinction is where the Howze case landed. Police responded to a report that two people had been shot. Officers went to the hospital to find out what happened and to speak with the wounded. While there, an officer saw blood on the patient’s clothing and had a crime scene technician collect it. The Court of Appeals held that the officer was somewhere he had a right to be, relying in part on an earlier decision approving an officer’s presence in an emergency room while gathering evidence about a shooting. What the officer could plainly see, he could act on.

Two practical points follow for anyone in that position.

The first is that being the victim does not protect your property. The clothing in Howze was collected while he was the one who had been shot, years before anyone suspected him of anything. Bloodstained clothing can hold evidence of a violent event no matter who the wearer turns out to be, and once officers take it as evidence, they can keep it while the case remains unsolved. In that case, the clothing sat sealed in an evidence locker for years and resurfaced in a completely different investigation.

The second is that police presence in a hospital is not unlimited. Howze does not say officers may walk into any treatment room whenever they want evidence. The ruling rested on why officers were there, what they were investigating, where the officer was standing, and what was visible from that lawful position. Change those facts and the analysis can change with them. Whether officers had a lawful right to be where they were, and lawful access to the thing they took, remains part of the constitutional question in every case.

There is also something worth understanding about the conversation itself. Officers commonly arrive at the hospital to take a statement, and people who believe they are the victim usually talk freely. You are not required to give a statement, and anything you say during that conversation can be used later. If you have been injured under circumstances that police are investigating, the safer course is to get medical care first and speak with a lawyer before giving a detailed account.

Once Police Lawfully Have Your DNA, They Can Test It Later

The part of this area of law that surprises most people is not the seizure. It is what happens afterward.

There is a common assumption that DNA is different from other evidence. It feels personal in a way a gun or a phone does not. It carries information about your health, your family, your ancestry. Many people believe that even if police lawfully took something of theirs, the government still needs fresh permission before running genetic testing on it, and certainly before using the result in some unrelated case years down the road.

North Carolina law does not work that way right now.

The controlling idea comes from a 2001 decision called State v. Barkley. A man voluntarily gave police a blood sample during a murder investigation, expecting it would clear him. It did. Police later used DNA from that same sample to link him to a different crime entirely, and he argued that the second use violated his constitutional rights. The Court of Appeals disagreed.

Drawing blood is a search, and the government must comply with the Constitution to conduct a search. But once the sample has lawfully left the body, the privacy interest that made the draw a search is gone. Testing what the government already lawfully holds is not a new search. A lawfully obtained blood sample gets treated much like any other piece of physical evidence that can be sent to a laboratory.

Howze extends that reasoning to a situation with no consent at all. He never volunteered anything. Police simply seized bloodstained clothing during an investigation into a shooting where he was the wounded person. The Court of Appeals held that the difference did not matter because the analysis turns on whether the evidence was lawfully obtained, not on how cooperative the person was when it was obtained. The clothing was lawfully seized, so testing the blood on it years later added no further intrusion.

Two things flow from that, and both are worth knowing before you find yourself on the wrong side of the law.

Your genetic material can outlive the investigation it came from. Evidence collected in one case can sit in storage for years and then be pulled, tested, and compared against something in an entirely different case, in a different city, involving people you have never met. Nothing in this decision requires police to go back to a judge before making that comparison.

And the moment that decides everything happens early. Whether the government can use a DNA result usually turns on whether it lawfully got the item in the first place. If the original seizure was unlawful, the later test result may be challengeable no matter how sophisticated the laboratory work. If the original seizure was lawful, arguing about the test itself is a much harder road. That is why an experienced defense lawyer starts with how the evidence came into police hands, not with the crime lab report.

None of that means a DNA result is unbeatable. A constitutional ruling in the State’s favor says nothing about whether the sample was contaminated, whether the chain of custody holds, whether a mixed sample was interpreted correctly, whether the laboratory followed its own protocols, or what the statistical numbers actually mean. It also says nothing about when your DNA got somewhere or how it got there. Those remain fair fights.

Getting Property and Samples Back From Police

People who have been the victim of a crime commonly assume their belongings will be returned once they are released from the hospital. That is not how evidence storage works. Property collected as part of an open investigation stays in police custody, and an unsolved case is treated as still open even after years of inactivity. The witnesses in this case testified that a stalled investigation is not a closed one and that evidence is held precisely because new information may surface later. Whether property can be released, and what happens to biological material on it, depends on the status of the case, the agency’s retention policy, and the statutes governing preservation of biological evidence. Those are worth asking about early rather than assuming that time alone clears the shelf.

Can You Challenge DNA Evidence?

Everything in this decision rests on one condition. Police had the evidence lawfully. Remove that condition and the analysis changes.

If the original seizure violates the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Sections 19 or 20 of the North Carolina Constitution, a later DNA result presents a very different problem for the State.

Sometimes that is why the first questions a defense lawyer asks have nothing to do with genetics.

  • Where did the item come from?
  • Why did police have it?
  • Was the officer lawfully present?
  • Did he have lawful access to the seized evidence?
  • Was its evidentiary value actually apparent at the time, or is the State reasoning backward from what testing later revealed?

The Howze decision also does not treat all genetic testing as the same.

A related overstatement is worth heading off. It would be easy to read Howze as a case that holds DNA lasts forever and that police may keep and test whatever they have for as long as they want. How long law enforcement may retain each category of biological material, what the statutes require for preservation, and when samples must be destroyed or expunged are separate questions potentially worthy of consideration.

Motions to Suppress DNA Evidence

Howze may, in fact, change the focus of criminal defense lawyers in cases involving previously collected biological evidence.

A motion that merely argues, “My client never consented to this later DNA test,” could face a substantial obstacle when the State can establish that police already lawfully possessed the biological evidence. Howze and Barkley give prosecutors some level of cover for that general theory.

The factual and legal analysis might need to focus on other issues, such as:

  • Why did law enforcement possess the evidence?
  • Was there a warrant? Consent? Abandonment? Plain view? A statutory collection procedure?
  • Was the officer lawfully present when the evidence was observed?
  • Did police have a lawful right of access?
  • Was the evidentiary significance actually apparent at the time, or is the State using later developments to justify an earlier seizure?

Those questions would address the constitutional foundation of the evidence itself.

To be clear, a constitutional ruling does not establish that a DNA result is scientifically reliable, that the sample was uncontaminated, that chain of custody is satisfactory, that a mixture was interpreted properly, or that the statistical testimony offered by the State accurately describes the significance of the result.

Nor does a DNA association necessarily establish when biological material was deposited, how it arrived at a particular location, or what activity produced it.

Howze answers an interesting, if not a somewhat factually odd/unique, search-and-seizure question. It does not decide every evidentiary question that may accompany DNA testimony at trial.

Discarded DNA Evidence in North Carolina

Police sometimes recover biological material from a cup, straw, cigarette, food container, bottle, napkin, or other property discarded in a public place. Those cases tend to focus on abandonment, reasonable expectations of privacy, curtilage, where police obtained the item, and whether officers physically intruded into a constitutionally protected area.

Howze presents a different route to the DNA crime lab.

The State did not argue that Howze abandoned the shirt. Police affirmatively seized it as evidence during a shooting investigation and retained it. The constitutional question, therefore, began with the plain-view doctrine and lawful police possession rather than with abandonment.

Frequently Asked Questions | Warrantless DNA Testing in North Carolina

Can North Carolina police test DNA evidence without a warrant?

North Carolina police may test DNA evidence without obtaining a separate warrant when the biological material was already lawfully in their possession. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that once evidence containing blood or other biological material is lawfully seized, comparing that material against evidence from another investigation is not a new search requiring judicial authorization.

Can police use DNA collected during one investigation in a different criminal case?

North Carolina police can use DNA from an old case in a new one, as long as they got the evidence legally the first time. Evidence from an unsolved case can sit in a police storage locker for years. A detective working a different case can pull that item, send it to the crime lab, and compare the results to evidence in the newer case. Courts have said that does not create a new constitutional problem. What matters is whether police had a legal right to take the item back when they took it. It does not matter how much time has passed, whether you were the victim, a witness, or never charged in the first case.

Can police seize anything that might contain DNA?

Police need a lawful basis to take your property, and the possibility that an item carries DNA is not enough on its own. Before testing ever becomes an issue, the questions are whether the officer was lawfully present where the item was observed, whether its value as evidence of a crime was apparent at that moment, and whether the officer had lawful access to it. When those conditions are met, police may seize the item without a warrant and send it for testing later. When they are not, the seizure itself was unlawful, and the DNA results that followed from it remain open to challenge.

Can police seize bloody clothing from someone receiving treatment at a hospital?

Police may take bloodstained clothing from a hospital patient without a warrant when officers are lawfully at the hospital investigating a crime and blood is plainly visible from where they are standing. That can happen whether the patient is a suspect, a witness, or the person who was shot. Medical privacy rules limit what your doctors and nurses may disclose. That does not always mean a treatment room is off limits to police. Their presence may still be subject to certain limits, such as why officers were there and what they could actually see at the time.

Is DNA testing a Fourth Amendment search?

Taking biological material directly from a person, such as drawing blood or swabbing the inside of a cheek, is treated as a search under both the federal and North Carolina constitutions. Testing that material afterward is treated differently. North Carolina courts have held that once a sample has lawfully been obtained, the privacy interest that made the collection a search no longer applies, and running scientific analysis on what police already lawfully possess is not a second search requiring separate approval. The same reasoning covers biological material found on lawfully seized property, such as blood on clothing. The constitutional question is how police obtained the material, not what the crime lab did with it later.

Can you challenge DNA evidence?

DNA evidence might be challenged on several fronts. Defense counsel might question how the item was seized, whether officers had lawful access to it, how the evidence was stored and handled, whether the sample was contaminated, how a mixed sample was interpreted, whether the laboratory followed its own procedures, and whether the statistics offered at trial fairly describe what the result means. A DNA match doesn’t answer when biological material was left behind, how it got there, or what someone was doing at the time.

Can police keep DNA evidence forever?

Police retention of biological evidence depends on the status of the case and the rules governing that category of evidence, not on any single rule permitting indefinite storage. Items collected during an unsolved investigation may remain in police custody for years, because an inactive case is not treated as a closed one, and evidence held that way can be retrieved and tested long afterward. Separate statutes and agency policies address preservation requirements, destruction, and expunction for particular types of evidence and particular case outcomes. Whether a specific item may be released or must be preserved is worth asking about directly rather than assuming that time alone clears the shelf.

Does North Carolina take your DNA when you are arrested?

North Carolina takes a DNA sample at arrest for a specific list of serious offenses, not for every felony charge. The list includes murder, manslaughter, sex offenses, serious assaults, kidnapping, human trafficking, arson, burglary, armed robbery, stalking, and offenses requiring sex offender registration, along with attempts and conspiracies to commit them. The sample is usually a cheek swab taken at arrest or at fingerprinting. When someone is arrested without a warrant, the sample is not supposed to be taken until a judicial official has made a probable cause determination.

If your case is dismissed, does the State keep your DNA?

North Carolina law requires the State Crime Laboratory to remove your DNA record and destroy your sample when the case ends in your favor. That covers a dismissal, an acquittal, a conviction for only a lesser misdemeanor that does not itself require a sample, and situations where no charge was filed within the statute of limitations. Winning your case does not clear the database when the State has an independent reason to keep your DNA on file, such as a prior conviction or a separate arrest that requires collection on its own. In that situation the sample stays, even though this particular charge went away.

What is discarded DNA evidence?

Discarded DNA evidence is genetic material left behind on something a person threw away or walked away from. It might be a coffee cup dropped in a trash can, a cigarette butt left on a sidewalk, a straw, a water bottle, or a napkin. Police collect the item and send it to the crime lab because the person’s DNA is on it, and they do so without a warrant, a cheek swab, or consent

DNA Evidence | Criminal Defense in North Carolina

DNA evidence can be powerful, but the laboratory result is only one part of the case. Defense lawyers may examine how police obtained the biological material, whether they had lawful authority to possess it, what testing was performed, how the sample was handled, and what the resulting association actually proves. A DNA match or inclusion does not necessarily establish when biological material was deposited, how it reached a particular location, or whether it proves the conduct alleged. In a serious criminal case, those questions can be just as consequential as the genetic comparison itself.

Bill Powers has practiced criminal law in North Carolina courtrooms since 1992. He is a former President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice and a recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award. He also enjoys teaching continuing legal education programs on criminal law, evidence, and trial advocacy. Powers Law Firm represents clients in criminal cases in Charlotte and surrounding communities and may be available to help with select serious felony matters elsewhere in North Carolina. If DNA evidence is part of your case, the office can be reached at 704-342-4357.

Carrying a concealed weapon in North Carolina without a concealed carry permit (or in violation of a CCW permit) can result in a criminal conviction and the associated consequences of a criminal record. In State v. Simpson, COA24-1092, filed July 15, 2026, the North Carolina Court of Appeals holds that two firearms carried during the same instance of conduct supported only one punishable violation of the applicable concealed weapon statute.

Carry Concealed Weapon Charges in North Carolina

North Carolina law regulates when someone may carry a concealed pistol, gun, or other weapon. The facts of the encounter, the type of weapon, where and how it was carried, and whether a statutory exception applies can affect both the charge and the permissible judgment.

Carrying a Concealed Weapon in North Carolina How the CCW Law applies
What is carrying a concealed weapon in North Carolina? N.C.G.S. § 14-269 prohibits willfully and intentionally carrying certain concealed weapons about the person, subject to statutory exceptions and other provisions governing lawful concealed carry.
Can someone be charged for carrying more than one concealed gun? The State may bring multiple charges when more than one firearm is involved, but the number of guns does not necessarily determine how many judgments and punishments the law permits.
Can two concealed guns support two separate judgments? Not necessarily. Under State v. Simpson, multiple firearms carried during the same instance of conduct did not create a separate allowable unit of prosecution for each gun under the version of N.C.G.S. § 14-269 before the Court.
Does a concealed carry permit matter? A valid concealed handgun permit may provide statutory authority to carry a concealed handgun when the permit holder complies with the applicable law and no other prohibition applies.
Can separate incidents lead to separate carrying concealed weapon charges? Distinct acts of carrying on separate occasions may support separate charges and judgments because each incident may constitute a separate violation.
Does consolidation of charges eliminate a multiple-punishment issue? Consolidating offenses for sentencing does not necessarily cure the improper entry of judgment on more than one offense when the statute authorizes only one unit of prosecution.
What happens when the concealed weapon statute is ambiguous about multiple punishments? North Carolina courts may apply the rule of lenity when genuine statutory ambiguity remains, resolving that ambiguity against additional punishment not clearly authorized by the General Assembly.

 

The 2026 decision in State v. Simpson is interesting for reasons that extend well beyond carrying a concealed weapon, with or without a concealed carry permit.

At its core, Simpson asks, “Who decides how many crimes a defendant has committed when one course of conduct involves multiple prohibited items?” Is it enough for the State to count the objects and charge one crime for each? Can a court enter multiple convictions but avoid the problem by consolidating them into a single judgment? What happens when the criminal statute itself does not clearly answer the question?

The Court of Appeals returned to a principle that runs through North Carolina criminal law. The General Assembly defines criminal offenses and determines the allowable unit of prosecution. When the legislature has not clearly authorized multiple punishments, courts cannot create them through statutory interpretation.

The opinion also addresses two significant sentencing questions. The Court considered the extent to which a judge may discuss conduct associated with charges on which a jury returned not-guilty verdicts. It also held that a trial court cannot impose a longer misdemeanor probationary period than ordinarily authorized by statute without making the findings the General Assembly requires.

The result was unusual. The Court of Appeals vacated the entire consolidated judgment and sent the case back to Superior Court, even while acknowledging that one of the sentencing issues may already have become moot.

Concealed Weapon Convictions

Whether a criminal defendant can receive multiple carrying a concealed weapon convictions in North Carolina depends on more than the number of firearms involved.

The defendant in State v. Simpson was convicted of two counts of carrying a concealed firearm under N.C.G.S. § 14-269. The two charges arose from two firearms found during the same encounter. The trial court consolidated both convictions into one judgment and imposed a suspended sentence with twenty-four months of probation.

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court should have arrested judgment on one of the two convictions.

The Court of Appeals agreed.

N.C.G.S. § 14-269 makes it unlawful for anyone to willfully and intentionally carry concealed about his or her person “any pistol or gun,” subject to statutory exceptions.

The question was whether the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “any pistol or gun” created a separate criminal offense for every firearm involved.

The Court concluded that it did not clearly do so.

That does not establish a blanket rule that multiple firearms can never result in multiple concealed weapon convictions. Distinct acts occurring at different times or under materially different circumstances may present a different legal question.

But when multiple firearms are involved in a single instance of carrying, the State cannot simply count the firearms and assume that each one constitutes another separately punishable violation of the statute.

To understand why, it is necessary to distinguish the number of prohibited objects from the number of crimes the legislature created.

One Criminal Act, Multiple Convictions

A “unit of prosecution” identifies the conduct the General Assembly has made separately punishable under the NC criminal laws.

The distinction matters when a single course of conduct involves more than one prohibited object. The presence of multiple firearms at the same time, for example, does not by itself establish that the legislature authorized a separate judgment and punishment for each firearm.

The legal analysis begins with the statute itself.

In State v. Conley, the North Carolina Supreme Court described the decision to authorize one punishment or multiple punishments as a quintessential example of a policy decision reserved for a legislative body. That principle also drives the analysis in State v. Simpson.

The General Assembly decides what conduct constitutes a separately punishable offense. Prosecutors may bring charges based on the facts and their interpretation of the law, and juries may return guilty verdicts on those charges. But the trial court may enter judgment and impose punishment only to the extent authorized by the statute.

That is where the unit of prosecution becomes important.

When a North Carolina criminal statute does not clearly establish whether multiple prohibited items involved in one instance of conduct create one offense or several, the court (the trial court judge) must determine the allowable unit of prosecution from the statutory text and controlling precedent. If genuine ambiguity remains, the rule of lenity prevents the court from allowing multiple convictions, judgments, or punishments beyond what the General Assembly clearly authorized.

The question is therefore not simply how many firearms or other prohibited items were involved. The question becomes how many separately punishable offenses the General Assembly created.

In Simpson, the Court of Appeals concluded that N.C.G.S. § 14-269 did not clearly establish a separate unit of prosecution for each concealed firearm carried during the same instance of conduct. The existence of two firearms therefore did not authorize the trial court to enter judgment and impose punishment on two separate counts merely because two guns were involved.

Consolidating Two Convictions | Still Judicial Error

One of the more interesting aspects of Simpson concerns what happened after the jury returned its verdicts.

The trial court consolidated the two carrying a concealed weapon convictions into a single judgment.

At first glance, that might appear to eliminate any multiple-punishment concern. The defendant did not receive two consecutive sentences. They were sentenced to one consolidated sentence consistent with the Felony Punishment Chart in North Carolina.

The North Carolina Supreme Court previously rejected the premise that consolidation necessarily resolves the constitutional problem.

As the Court recognized in State v. Etheridge, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the NC State Constitution prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense absent clear legislative intent to the contrary.

The existence of two convictions can matter even if the convictions produce only one consolidated sentence.

A criminal conviction is itself a legal consequence.

As Etheridge sets forth, separate convictions may create adverse collateral consequences. For that reason, putting two convictions into one judgment does not necessarily eliminate a double jeopardy or multiple-punishment problem.

The Court of Appeals therefore did not simply leave both convictions in place and correct the probationary sentence.

It vacated the consolidated judgment.

On remand, the trial court must arrest judgment on one of the two carrying a concealed weapon convictions.

Unconstitutional means Unconstitutional

This may be the most interesting part of Simpson from an appellate and policy perspective.

The Court concluded that two judgments could not properly be entered. At the same time, it openly acknowledged that the practical harm caused by the second conviction was “a challenge to articulate.”

That is unusual language in an appellate opinion.

The Court examined whether the additional conviction could affect the defendant’s prior record level in a future criminal case.

Under North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing Act, when a defendant receives more than one conviction in a single superior court during one calendar week, only the conviction with the highest point total generally counts when calculating the defendant’s prior record level.

The two convictions in Simpson therefore did not appear likely to increase the defendant’s prior record level in a future case.

The Court wrote that it “struggle[d] to envision adverse collateral consequences under these circumstances.”

Yet it still declined to leave the additional conviction in place.

Why?

Because the issue potentially implicated the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense.

The Court recognized that an unauthorized criminal conviction is still unconstitutional, even if it creates no meaningful harm simply because a particular collateral consequence is not immediately apparent.

The constitutional question also affects the applicable prejudice analysis. A violation of a defendant’s federal constitutional rights is prejudicial unless the appellate court determines that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, with the State bearing the burden of demonstrating harmlessness.

The Court ultimately declined to resolve the problem by declaring the additional conviction harmless.

Instead, it vacated the consolidated judgment, ordered one judgment arrested, and expressly invited the North Carolina Supreme Court to provide additional guidance.

That invitation deserves attention.

The opinion exposes a difficult question about the legal status of an unauthorized conviction. If the conviction does not increase the immediate sentence and apparently will not affect a future prior record level, is the mere existence of the additional conviction itself sufficient prejudice?

Simpson does not provide a final answer to that broader question.

It does make clear that a court should not casually leave an unauthorized conviction on a defendant’s record simply because identifying its future consequences requires some speculation.

Arrest Judgment | Setting Aside Conviction as a matter of law

The remedy ordered in Simpson also illustrates the difference between an erroneous sentence and an unauthorized conviction.

To arrest judgment means that the Court (the sentencing judges) does not enter judgment on a conviction because a legal defect prevents judgment from being imposed.

In Simpson, the problem was not necessarily that the jury lacked evidence that two firearms existed.

Two guns were involved.

The problem was that the applicable statute did not authorize two separately punishable offenses merely because two firearms were carried during the same instance of conduct.

If a jury returns multiple guilty verdicts but the governing statute authorizes only one unit of prosecution, consolidating the verdicts for sentencing does not cure the problem. The court may need to arrest judgment on the duplicative conviction.

That is exactly what the Court of Appeals ordered in Simpson.

Can a Judge Consider Something the Jury Found NOT GUILTY?

The concealed weapon issue was not the only interesting part of the opinion.

The jury in Simpson acquitted the defendant of the remaining charges, including the marijuana-related offenses.

At sentencing, however, the trial judge referred to the amount of money, the guns, and a vacuum-sealed item found during the investigation. The judge said they could not ignore those circumstances.

That raises an uncomfortable but important question.

What does an acquittal mean at sentencing?

A jury’s not-guilty verdict means the State did not prove the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not necessarily constitute an affirmative finding that every fact associated with the charge was false.

Sentencing courts may consider a broad range of information concerning the defendant and the circumstances surrounding the offense. That authority, however, does not permit a judge to punish a defendant for a crime the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Simpson, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge did not cross that line. The judge expressly questioned whether the disputed items even belonged to the defendant and focused instead on the defendant’s proximity to those circumstances and the people with whom she associated. Even so, the Court cautioned against discussing acquitted conduct during sentencing.

Put simply, the Court’s authority has limits.

A sentencing judge cannot punish a defendant for exercising the right to a trial by rejecting a plea offer. North Carolina appellate decisions have also identified improper reliance on certain considerations involving finances, religion, and alleged criminal conduct.

The difficult question arises when a judge discusses evidence associated with a charge that resulted in an acquittal.

There is a meaningful difference between considering the circumstances surrounding a convicted offense and effectively punishing someone for another offense that the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt.

Determining where one ends and the other begins can be difficult.

How Long Can Misdemeanor Probation Last in North Carolina?

The probation issue in Simpson involved a more direct statutory error.

The defendant had no prior convictions and qualified as a Level I offender for misdemeanor sentencing.

The trial court imposed twenty-four months of probation.

Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d), the original period of probation for a misdemeanant receiving community punishment generally must fall between six and eighteen months.

A trial court has authority to impose a longer or shorter period.

But the statute requires specific findings that the different period is necessary.

The trial court in Simpson did not make those findings.

The judge indicated that twenty-four months was being imposed as part of community punishment, but that did not satisfy the statutory requirement.

The Court of Appeals therefore held that the probationary sentence was erroneous.

The point is not that a North Carolina judge can never impose twenty-four months of probation for a misdemeanor, but instead the authority to exceed the ordinary statutory range comes with a statutory condition.

The court must make the required specific findings.

Judicial discretion does not include authority to disregard the procedure the General Assembly established for exercising that discretion.

The slow nature of appeals in North Carolina

By the time the Court of Appeals decided the Simpson case, another problem had developed.

Time.

The trial court entered judgment in February 2024 and imposed twenty-four months of probation. The Court of Appeals filed the opinion at issue in July 2026.

The defendant’s probation therefore may already have ended.

If the defendant successfully completed probation, there may be no remaining probationary sentence to correct. North Carolina appellate decisions recognize that a sentencing challenge may become moot after the defendant has fully served the challenged sentence.

The appellate record did not establish what had happened to the defendant’s probation in the meantime.

The probation could have been completed. It could have been extended or modified. It could have been revoked.

The Court of Appeals therefore did not assume facts outside the record.

Instead, it vacated the consolidated judgment and sent the case back with instructions that account for either possibility.

The trial court must arrest judgment on one carrying a concealed weapon conviction.

If the probation issue has become moot, the trial court must enter judgment on the remaining count.

If the sentencing issue remains live, the trial court must resentence the defendant.

The procedural result is unusual, but it reflects the different errors the Court identified. It also speaks volumes about how long the appellate process can take in North Carolina.

One conviction cannot legally remain as a separately punishable offense. The sentencing error, by contrast, may or may not still require a remedy depending on what happened while the appeal remained pending.

Multiple Carrying a Concealed Weapon Charges Require Careful Legal Analysis

State v. Simpson provides a useful reminder that the number of charges filed does not always determine the number of convictions, judgments, or punishments North Carolina law ultimately permits.

In cases involving multiple firearms or other prohibited items, the analysis may depend on the specific wording of the criminal statute, the allowable unit of prosecution, controlling appellate decisions, and whether the General Assembly clearly authorized separate punishment for each alleged offense.

The same care applies at sentencing. Trial courts have broad discretion to consider relevant information, but that discretion remains subject to statutory requirements and constitutional limitations. A sentencing court must also follow the procedures required by law when imposing probation outside the ordinary statutory range.

For defendants and lawyers, Simpson is another example of why criminal cases cannot always be evaluated simply by counting charges, objects, or verdicts. The legal question may be more fundamental. The court must determine what conduct the General Assembly actually made separately punishable.

Bill Powers has represented clients in North Carolina criminal courts since 1992 and has devoted much of his professional career to criminal law, evidence, trial advocacy, and the education of other lawyers. He is a former President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice, a recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award, and a regular instructor and chair of continuing legal education programs involving criminal law and trial strategy.

Powers Law Firm handles DWI and criminal cases in Charlotte and the surrounding area and may be available to assist with select serious criminal matters elsewhere in North Carolina. Call 704-342-4357 to discuss whether the firm may be available to help.

On May 20, 2026, the North Carolina Court of Appeals decided State v. Myers, a case that may quietly create one of the stranger jurisdictional and constitutional problems in modern North Carolina traffic-stop litigation. The opinion itself appears relatively narrow at first glance. Superior Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate contested standalone traffic ticket infractions unless N.C.G.S. § 7A-271(d) applies, even if those infractions are indicted alongside related felony and misdemeanor charges. Digging a bit deeper, the opinion more subtly raises a harder question for defense lawyers going forward.  What happens when the alleged traffic infraction is not properly triable in Superior Court, yet that same alleged violation is the entire constitutional basis for the felony stop, detention, seizure, or arrest?

TL;DR:  A New Hanover County jury convicted defendant of felony fleeing to elude arrest by motor vehicle and misdemeanor resisting a public officer. The jury also found them responsible for two traffic infractions, those being failure to signal a lane change and failure to carry a valid driver’s license. The Superior Court consolidated the misdemeanor conviction with the infractions and entered judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated the consolidated judgment, holding that Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the contested standalone infractions because they were not lesser-included violations and the defendant did not admit responsibility. The fact that the infractions were included in an indictment returned by a grand jury did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

N.C.G.S. § 7A-253 sets forth that original and exclusive jurisdiction for the adjudication and disposition of infractions lies in District Court, except as provided in N.C.G.S. § 7A-271(d). Superior Court must submit an infraction to the jury when it is a lesser-included violation of a criminal action properly before the court. Superior Court may also accept an admission of responsibility to an infraction when it is either lesser-included or a related charge. Myers did not fit either category. The defendant did not admit responsibility, and the alleged infractions were not lesser-included violations of the felony or misdemeanor charges.

In the recent appellate decision of North Carolina v. Escalante (also cited as State v. Escalante), No. COA25-64, filed December 17, 2025, the North Carolina Court of Image representaing police officer testifying in court illustrating Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues under North Carolina criminal law Appeals examined whether the defendant had the legal right, known as standing, to challenge the legality of electronic surveillance used in his arrest. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendant lacked standing to seek suppression because he could not demonstrate a personal privacy interest in the phone that was tracked.

At the Powers Law Firm, we enjoy helping clients navigate complex legal issues. Bill Powers, a seasoned trial attorney with more than three decades of courtroom experience, is a former President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice and a recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award. He is a widely regarded criminal defense lawyer in North Carolina and a frequent speaker and seminar host in the legal community. If you have questions about your legal rights, we invite you to reach out to Bill Powers at Powers Law Firm for guidance.

TL;DR “Hot Take” in North Carolina vs. Escalante

The North Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Hickman (COA24-893, filed November 5, 2025) revisits a foundational Civil warrants and criminal searches in North Carolina courtroom scene symbolizing Fourth Amendment protections and limits question in constitutional law. When government agents enter private property without a warrant, what happens to the evidence they obtain?

While the case involves a Department of Revenue tax warrant rather than a traditional criminal investigation, its implications extend beyond tax collection. It clarifies the continuing role of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution in protecting private dwellings from unauthorized searches and seizures.

The opinion also reaffirms an older, quieter truth that sometimes gets lost in modern exclusionary-rule debate.

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