Criminal Procedure - Outline Part 12

Fernandez v. California (2014) → when one resident denies entry into a dwelling, but is arrested on independent grounds, then come back to the dwelling and get consent to search by another resident, “consent by one resident of jointly occupied premises is generally sufficient to justify a warrantless search.”

• Randolph is a “narrow exception” making clear that it was limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present

Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) → the third-party consent will be binding on the absent defendant even if the police were mistaken about whether the consenter in fact had joint authority over the premises, as long as the mistake was a reasonable one.

• E.g.) if the consenting third person falsely tells the police that she lives in the premises to be searched, and the police reasonably belive her, the lie will not invalidate the consent
• Even if the consenter is an “infrequent visitor” rather than a “usual resident” with no true authority to allow the police to make a warrantless entry or search; so long as the police were reasonably mistaken in their believe that the consenter had authority to consent, this is the same as if she had actually had such authority.
  • B/c the 4^th Amendment bans only “unreasonable” searches and seizures, and where the police make a factual determination about a search, their reasonable mistake on the issue of authority to consent transforms the search into a “reasonable” one

• A consent search is invalid, even if the consent was voluntary, if the police exceed the scope of the consent granted
• Florida v. Jimeno (1991) → it is reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect’s general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of his car, i.e., suspect granted the officer permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search
  • It is objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search respondents’ car included consent to search containers within the car which might bear drugs
  • The 4^th Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable
  • The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 4^th Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness – what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?

Terry v. Ohio (1968) → a stop-and-frisk could be constitutionally permissible despite the lack of probable cause for either full arrest or full search, and despite the fact that a brief detainment not amounting to a full arrest was a “seizure” requiring some degree of 4^th Amendment protection

• “Seizure” → Court agreed that the detainment of the defendant on the street was a sufficient intrusion on his freedom that it was a “seizure” within the meaning of the 4^th Amendment
• “Search” → Court also agreed that the “pat-down” of the defendant was a “search” within the meaning of the 4^th Amendment, even though it was not a full-scale body search
• Not Unreasonable → Court rejected the argument that b/c a 4^th Amendment seizure and search took place, “probable cause” was required, i.e., a stop-and-frisk does not require probable cause because the exigent circumstances (the need to act quickly) justified dispensing with the warrant requirement, allowed the Court to conclude that probable cause was not constitutionally required
  • Only Test → the only constitutional test is whether the stop and/or frisk was unreasonable
• Rule → “where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquires, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the 4^th Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.”