As of 2026, the phrase “stand your ground” is the gateway term that most non-lawyers use when they are trying to understand North
The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s decision in State v. Allison, No. 103PA24, filed December 12, 2025, addresses how trial courts must instruct juries when the defense seeks a castle-doctrine instruction under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2. The opinion reinforces that the statute must be given as written, including its definitions, presumptions, and rebuttal structure, and that reverting to pre-statute reasonableness instructions is legal error.
The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury instructions allowed jurors to decide reasonableness and necessity outside the statutory presumption framework and because the jury was not instructed that curtilage is part of the “home” under the statute.
At the Powers Law Firm, this type of statutory and appellate analysis is part of our day-to-day work as defense lawyers. Bill Powers is a trial lawyer with more than three decades of courtroom experience and is a former President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice. He is also a recipient of the North Carolina State Bar’s John B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award. Bill regularly teaches lawyers across the state on criminal law and trial practice.
If you have questions about how North Carolina self-defense law applies to a real situation, or how recent Supreme Court decisions may affect a pending case, please contact Bill Powers and the criminal defense lawyers at Powers Law Firm for a confidential discussion.
TL;DR The majority treated State v. Phillips as controlling law on the operation of the statutory presumption. Once the jury finds the statutory conditions for the presumption of reasonable fear, the State may defeat that presumption only through the specific rebuttal circumstances listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). The jury may not be invited to disregard the presumption based on generalized evidence of unreasonableness or necessity untethered from the statute. The Court held that the instructions given in Allison did exactly that. They allowed jurors to decide whether the defendant’s fear and use of force were reasonable without first requiring the State to establish a statutory rebuttal circumstance. That sequencing is incompatible with the statute and, despite failing to preserve the issue at trial, is plain error.
| Decision Tree Stage | N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 | Instruction takeaway after State v. Allison (filed Dec. 12, 2025) |
|---|---|---|
| Stage 1 | Predicate facts for the presumption | The jury decides whether the evidence establishes an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry into a protected location as defined by the statute, and whether the lawful occupant knew or had reason to believe that entry or attempted entry occurred. The “home” definition includes curtilage. |
| Stage 2 | Statutory presumption | If the jury finds the statutory predicate facts, the presumption in § 14-51.2(b) applies. The instructions must present the statute’s presumption framework as written rather than converting the analysis into a generic “reasonableness first” self-defense inquiry. |
| Stage 3 | Rebuttal structure | The instructions must address rebuttal through the statutory circumstances in § 14-51.2(c) when supported by the evidence, and must not invite the jury to disregard the statutory presumption through a free-form evaluation untethered to the statute’s structure. |
| Stage 4 | Verdict consequences of the framework | The jury’s deliberations must track the statutory sequence. Instructional errors that remove curtilage from the “home” definition, or that collapse the presumption into generic self-defense language, can create reversible error depending on preservation and the appellate standard of review. |
Protection of Home, Place of Work, and Motor Vehicle | Curtilage as part of the “Home”
The Supreme Court treats the statutory definition of “home” as outcome-determinative. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 expressly includes curtilage. In Allison, the confrontation occurred at the doorway and porch area, and the State argued that the doctrine did not apply because the victim had not crossed the threshold.
The jury was never instructed that curtilage counts as part of the home. The Supreme Court held that omission was legal error because it narrowed the protected location in a way the statute does not permit, particularly where the factual dispute centered on the doorway and porch.
Plain error and Prejudice
Even under plain-error review, a notoriously difficult standard for the defense to overcome, the Court found prejudice. The ruling sets forth that a properly instructed jury could have found an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry into the curtilage and the defendant’s knowledge of that fact, which would have triggered the statutory presumption.
Without proof of a rebuttal circumstance, that finding would have required acquittal.
The Court rejected the State’s argument that the verdict implicitly resolved those issues against the defendant.
The dissent and what it signals
The dissent argued that the State v Phillips treatment of rebuttal was obiter dictum and that the presumption should remain subject to rebuttal through generalized reasonableness evidence. The majority rejected that reading and reaffirmed Phillips as controlling authority.
Practically, the dissent outlines the arguments prosecutors are likely to raise in future cases attempting to narrow Phillips. The majority’s opinion closes that door, at least for now.
Post Allison| Self Defense Jury Instructions
Allison provides clear authority to demand a statute-faithful instruction sequence:
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Whether the defendant was a lawful occupant and whether there was an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry into the home, including curtilage.
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If so, application of the statutory presumption of reasonable fear.
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Consideration of rebuttal only through the circumstances listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c).
Instructions that invite jurors to decide fear, necessity, or proportionality outside that structure are incompatible with the statute and now squarely condemned by the Supreme Court.
NC Castle Doctrine in 2026
Allison will very much matter in future North Carolina criminal charges and the self defense theory of the Castle Doctrine, where the defense asks for a N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 instruction and the trial judge reaches for a pre-Phillips pattern charge.
The Court’s bottom line is straightforward.
If the evidence supports a castle doctrine instruction, the jury has to receive the statute as written, including the statute’s presumptions, the curtilage definition, and the statute’s rebuttal structure.
The opinion reverses and sends the case (State v Allison) back for a new trial because the instructions let the jury decide “reasonableness” in a way the statute removes once the statutory trigger facts are found, and because the jury never got told that curtilage counts as part of the “home.”
What the NC Supreme Court held in Allison in big picture, practical terms
The majority (Justice Berger) treats State v. Phillips as controlling on the rebuttal question. Under that view, once the jury finds the statutory facts establishing the presumption, the State can defeat the presumption through the five circumstances listed in § 14-51.2(c). The jury is not invited to rebut the presumption through a free-form “evidence to the contrary” reasonableness evaluation that is untethered from § 14-51.2(c). The opinion sets forth that the instructions in Alssion did exactly that, resulting in plain, reversible error.
For trial lawyers, the opinion also makes abundantly clear that the statutory definition of “home” includes curtilage. The Court treats it as a serious instructional defect if the jury is not told the curtilage is part of the protected location for § 14-51.2 purposes, particularly given the contested doorway and porch facts and the State’s theory that the defense fails if the victim never crossed the threshold.
Why the pattern-style jury instruction was a problem
The instruction the jury received was in substance:
- The defendant is justified in the use of force if they reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent entry or terminate entry, and they further reasonably believed the intruder would kill or seriously injure someone in the home.
- That formulation pulls the jury back into the pre-statute world where the defendant has to prove or the jury has to find reasonableness as an initial matter.
- The Court’s majority says that move conflicts with the legislature’s structure when § 14-51.2(b) is triggered and the State has not established a § 14-51.2(c) rebuttal circumstance.
The majority treats “excessive force” analysis as inapplicable unless the presumption is rebutted vis-a-vis the statutory protocols. In other words, if the statutorily created (and defined) presumption stands, proportionality does not become a jury question inside the § 14-51.2 framework.
Plain error analysis and why the conviction did not survive
Because there was no objection, the Court works through plain error and still reverses. The majority characterizes the defects as fundamental because they “wholly eliminated consideration of lawful conduct” under the statute. It then finds prejudice because, on the record, a properly instructed jury would have found an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry into the curtilage and the defendant’s knowledge of that fact, which would trigger the presumptions and lead to acquittal absent proof of a § 14-51.2(c) circumstance. The opinion rejects the State’s invitation to infer a “no forcible entry” finding from a silent verdict sheet.
The dissent’s thesis and what it signals for future fights
Justice Riggs writes a long dissent that servers as a statutory rebuttal brief. In it, the dissent argues that Phillips’s discussion as to rebuttal being limited to § 14-51.2(c) is dicta and should not be treated as binding. The dissent then reads the statute’s phrase “shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the following circumstances” as leaving room for rebuttal through evidence that undermines reasonableness even when none of the five listed circumstances fits. The dissent also points to other statutes and other jurisdictions to argue that presumptions like this are not meant to function as an automatic immunity against criminal charges based on thin facts.
Whether you agree with it or not, the dissent is a roadmap for prosecutors and for appellate arguments in future cases that try to circumscribe, and limit Phillips. The majority rejects that roadmap and doubles down on Phillips as controlling, and it does so in a published decision issued after Phillips.
How to use Allison in trial court right now
If you are litigating § 14-51.2, this opinion gives you language to demand a jury instruction that walks jurors through a clean sequence. First, whether the defendant was a lawful occupant and whether the other person unlawfully and by force entered or attempted to enter the home as defined, including curtilage. If those prerequisite facts are found, the statutory presumptions apply. Next, the jury considers rebuttal through § 14-51.2(c) circumstances the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt. If the presumption is not rebutted, the statute’s structure points to acquittal. If rebutted, proportionality analysis comes back into the case.
It also gives defense counsel a potential appellate issue when the charge contains “evidence to the contrary” phrasing that invites jurors to decide fear and necessity without first finding a § 14-51.2(c) circumstance. The published NC Supreme Court decision makes clear that approach is incompatible with the statute. Counsel also now posses a published dissent that not only forecasts the counter-argument prosecutors will likely press, but also provides a the clear, unambiguous repudiation of that theoretical narrative by the majority.
Frequently Asked Questions | Stand Your Ground Law in NC
When people search for “stand your ground” in North Carolina, they are usually asking whether the law allows the use of deadly force without retreat at a home, doorway, porch, or other private property. North Carolina law does not label that question under a single statute titled “stand your ground.” Instead, the answer is found in a statutory use-of-force framework enacted by the General Assembly in 2011, most importantly N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2, commonly referred to as the castle doctrine, and N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3, which governs the absence of a duty to retreat where someone has a lawful right to be. Does North Carolina have a stand your ground law or a castle doctrine?
N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 defines “home” broadly and does it deliberately. The statute does not confine the protected location to the interior of a dwelling. It includes the curtilage, which captures the areas that function as part of the residence for real-world entry and confrontation analysis, including porches, doorways, and other immediately associated spaces. That definitional choice matters because the castle doctrine’s presumptions attach to the protected location. If the protected location is defined incorrectly in the charge, the presumption analysis starts from the wrong premises. Does the castle doctrine apply to your porch or yard in North Carolina?
Recent Supreme Court of North Carolina decisions, including State v. Phillips (procedural posture: review of erroneous jury instructions that invited proportionality analysis after the presumption applied) and State v. Allison (procedural posture: discretionary review reversing for plain error where the jury was not properly instructed on the statutory presumptions and curtilage), treat the doctrine as a decision tree that must be explained to jurors correctly. The analysis begins with two factual inquiries. Was the other actor unlawfully and forcefully entering, or attempting to enter, the protected location. Did the defendant know or have reason to believe that unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry was occurring or had occurred. Those questions are for the jury because they are questions of fact. Do juries decide reasonableness under the castle doctrine in North Carolina?
Before 2011, self-defense in North Carolina was governed primarily by common law. A defendant generally had to establish a reasonable belief of imminent death or great bodily harm, that deadly force was necessary, and that the defendant was not the aggressor. Depending on the setting, retreat could also factor into the analysis. Session Law 2011-268 changed that framework. The General Assembly enacted statutory presumptions that replace portions of the common law analysis when defined facts are present. Under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b), a lawful occupant is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm when an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry occurs and the occupant knew or had reason to believe it occurred. Once that presumption applies, core questions are removed from the jury’s discretion unless the State proves a statutory rebuttal circumstance. Can the State defeat the castle doctrine presumption in North Carolina?
The statute did not abolish common law self-defense. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(g) expressly preserves other defenses. What the statute did was create a separate, presumption-driven pathway that controls the analysis when its trigger conditions are met. Does the Common Law Defense of Self Defense still apply?
Stand Your Ground | NC Self Defense | Castle Doctrine
Recent decisions from the Supreme Court of North Carolina show how quickly a case can go off the rails when trial instructions treat the castle doctrine like generic self-defense. In State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513 (Aug. 23, 2024), the Supreme Court addressed how the statutory presumption operates and how improper instructions can inject proportionality questions at a point where the statute does not permit that analysis unless the presumption has been rebutted in the statutory manner. Justia+1 In State v. Allison, No. 103PA24 (Dec. 12, 2025), the Court allowed discretionary review of an unpublished Court of Appeals decision and then reversed and remanded for a new trial because the jury was not properly instructed on core statutory features, including the statute’s treatment of curtilage as part of the “home” and the structured way the presumption functions once the triggering facts are found.