Carolina Criminal Defense & DUI Lawyer UpdatesState v. Rogers examines the relationship between constitutional violations and judicial remedies regarding suppressing evidence in North Carolina, focusing on when unlawfully obtained evidence should be excluded and when statutory good-faith principles may permit the admission of objectively unlawfully obtained evidence (in violation of statutory or constitutional precepts) despite a defect in the underlying search.
By construing N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 to permit admission of evidence obtained through conduct later determined to be unlawful when officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on existing legal authority, the NC Supreme Court shifts suppression analysis away from a purely rights-based inquiry and toward a somewhat more remedial framework grounded in objective reasonableness and deterrence. The decision operates as a judicial construction that narrows the practical suppression issues long associated with Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution.
TL;DR Suppression litigation in North Carolina now turns less on abstract constitutional violations and more on the objective reasonableness of governmental reliance on external legal authority, the legal landscape confronting officers at the time judicial authorization was obtained, and whether exclusion would meaningfully deter future misconduct. Trial courts must therefore evaluate institutional knowledge, training, warrant practice, and the accuracy and completeness of information presented to judicial officials, rather than roadside judgments made without judicial involvement. For defense counsel, effective advocacy requires disciplined factual development capable of rebutting asserted good-faith reliance grounded in warrants, statutes, or court authorization, rather than reliance on doctrinal violation alone.
Have questions about suppression doctrine, search-and-seizure law, or the effect of recent North Carolina appellate decisions on a pending criminal matter? Contact Bill Powers at Powers Law Firm at 704-342-4357. Bill’s practice is grounded in decades of courtroom litigation across North Carolina, statewide professional leadership as a former president of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice, and recognition by the North Carolina State Bar for distinguished service.
| Issue | Pre-Rogers Understanding | Post-Rogers Direction Suggested by the Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Constitutional violation and suppression | A violation regularly resulted in suppression of the evidence | A violation may not require exclusion where officers relied objectively on statutes, warrants, or court orders |
| Role of good-faith reliance | Recognized in doctrine but limited in state constitutional suppression practice | Likely to assume a more central role in admissibility analysis involving external legal authority |
| Warrantless roadside conduct | Governed by traditional Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 analysis | Appears largely unaffected by the reliance framework discussed in Rogers |
| Article I, Section 20 remedies | Could support broader exclusion than federal law in some circumstances | Remedy analysis may now be more constrained by deterrence and objective reasonableness considerations |
| Defense strategy in suppression hearings | Legal violation commonly served as the primary focus | Greater emphasis is likely to fall on factual development, officer knowledge, and the deterrent value of exclusion |
Good-Faith Limitation on Suppression Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-974
The Doctrinal Shift
State v. Rogers No. 377PS22 (N.C. Oct. 17, 2025) seems likely to reframe suppression analysis in North Carolina by interpreting the statutory amendment to N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 by incorporating, at least in part, a good-faith exception that could significantly limit the exclusionary rule’s reach in certain matters. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through an unlawful search may still be admissible when officers acted under an objectively reasonable belief in the legality of their conduct.
This is not a marginal adjustment, as North Carolina law and procedure (consistent with the 1988 opinion of State v Carter) has for decades provided additional protections under the North Carolina State Constitution (Article I, Section 20) than required under the United States Constitution.
The Court ruling appears to separate certain Fourth Amendment violations from Fourth Amendment remedies.
As such, a search could conceptually be unconstitutional while the evidence remain admissible because exclusion would not meaningfully deter future police misconduct when the officers’ reliance on existing law or judicial authorization was objectively reasonable.
That is a tough interpretation of constitutional precepts, leading some to question, “Can a right exist without a remedy?”
The statutory language at issue provides that evidence shall not be suppressed if obtained in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute later held unconstitutional or a warrant or court order later determined to lack adequate legal foundation.
The Court in Rogers applied this language to approve admission of evidence obtained through a process that, under subsequent legal developments, was constitutionally defective.
Suppression | Boundaries of Good Faith & Unlawfully Obtained Evidence
The critical fact pattern in Rogers involves officers acting pursuant to judicial authorization obtained under a statutory framework that was, at the time, presumed valid.
Later constitutional analysis revealed deficiencies in that framework.
The North Carolina Supree Court concluded that officers who obtained and executed such authorization in good faith should not be punished through suppression when they had no reason to doubt the process’s legality.
On its face, that seems procedurally logical. In application, the result is substantially more disconcerting.
Fortunately, that protocol differs materially from warrantless searches conducted in the field based on officer judgment alone.
Rogers addresses reliance on external legal authority (statutes, court orders, judicial warrants) rather than officer-initiated searches lacking any such foundation.
That distinction matters for real world criminal defense lawyers slogging it out in court.
The good-faith framework in Rogers appears most viable when:
- Officers obtain judicial authorization before conducting the search
- The authorizing statute or legal standard was facially valid and had not been invalidated by controlling precedent
- Officers provided accurate information to the judicial officer and did not omit material facts
- Officers executed the authorization within its scope and terms
Conversely, good-faith reliance is weakest when:
- The search was warrantless and officers acted on their own assessment of legality
- Controlling appellate precedent had cast doubt on the legal theory underlying the search
- Officers omitted or misrepresented facts material to the legal justification
- Officers exceeded the scope of any authorization they obtained
- Legal theory was so tenuous that no objectively reasonable officer would have relied upon it
Implications for Article I, Section 20 and State Constitutional Remedies
Rogers also narrows the independent remedial (if not somewhat punitive) force of the North Carolina Constitution’s protections against unreasonable searches.
Traditional state constitutional jurisprudence suggests that Article I, Section 20 might provide broader suppression remedies than the Fourth Amendment, particularly where federal good-faith exceptions would bar relief.
Rogers forecloses that argument.
The Court’s analysis treats good-faith as a limitation on the remedy rather than as a question about the scope of the constitutional right. Even if the search violated Article I, Section 20, suppression may not be appropriate when officers relied objectively and reasonably on legal authority.
In truth, that does not eliminate state constitutional arguments entirely.
Defendants may still argue that North Carolina’s constitution provides greater substantive protection (defining a search more broadly, requiring stronger justification, or imposing stricter procedural requirements) than the Fourth Amendment.
Yet, once a violation is established, the remedy question is now governed by deterrence logic aligned with federal doctrine. That too is a substantive and substantial change to well-established precedence.
For practitioners, this might mean that state constitutional arguments should focus on substantive protection rather than on avoiding good-faith limitations.
The argument is not “North Carolina should suppress even when officers acted in good faith.” Instead, the argument now centers on, “North Carolina defines reasonable differently, and this search failed that standard.”
Suppression of Evidence | Battle of the Facts
Rogers may ultimately serve to transform suppression hearings from legal arguments into detailed factual contests about officer decision-making and institutional context.
Under the older model, suppression often functioned as a binary determination, to wit:
- Did the officer have probable cause?
- Did the stop exceed constitutional bounds?
If the answer was no, evidence was ordinarily suppressed.
Under Rogers, it seems likely that defense counsel must develop a factual record showing why reliance was unreasonable. This could involve evidence about what the officers knew, what information they omitted, what legal guidance was available, and whether reasonable officers in the same position would have recognized the legal deficiency.
Generic assertions that “the law was unclear” probably will not suffice. The defendant must show that controlling or persuasive authority put officers on notice that the conduct was problematic.
It will be important to prove exclusion retains deterrent value.
Even if the search was illegal, the State could argue that suppression serves no purpose when officers acted in reasonable reliance. Defense counsel therefore would be wise to counter by showing systemic problems (pattern evidence of similar violations, supervisory failures, deliberate ignorance of legal limits) that demonstrate why exclusion remains necessary to prevent future misconduct.
Courts evaluate reasonableness from the perspective of a trained officer, not from the subjective beliefs of the specific officers involved. Defense counsel will seek out training materials, departmental policies, or supervisory guidance that contradicts the officers’ claimed understanding of the law.
The evidentiary burden could prove significant, including:
- Early investigation into departmental training and policy on the legal issue at stake
- Supervisory review and approval mechanisms
- Prior instances where similar searches were conducted or challenged
- Legal advice the agency received from prosecutors or counsel (assuming arguendo obtaining such materials is even possible)
- Completeness and accuracy of information provided in affidavits or warrant applications.
Without such factual development, suppression motions will become arguments about abstract legal principles that courts will likely resolve in favor of the State under Rogers’ objective-reasonableness standard.
FAQs About the Good-Faith Exception in North Carolina After State v. Rogers
State v. Rogers sets forth that evidence obtained through a search later determined to be unlawful could be admitted when officers relied objectively and reasonably on statutes, warrants, or other judicial authorization. The existence of a violation and the availability of suppression are analyzed as related but distinct questions. Does a constitutional violation require suppression of evidence in North Carolina?
The reasoning in Rogers focuses on reliance on external legal authority, such as statutes, court orders, and warrants. Traditional Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 20 analysis continues to govern searches based solely on officer judgment without prior judicial authorization. As such, the Good Faith Exception does not appear to apply to roadside investigations or to instances in which the charging officer did not rely on judicial guidance in North Carolina. Does the good-faith exception apply to warrantless roadside searches or officer discretion in the field?
Courts still recognize broader substantive protections under the North Carolina State Constitution. The remedy of suppression of evidence may be more closely tied to analysis of practical deterrence and objective reasonableness when officers relied on apparently valid legal authority. Does Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution support suppression of evidence after the 2025 Rogers decision?
Overcoming a good-faith exception argument in North Carolina requires more than pointing out a constitutional defect in the search. Defense counsel focus on building a factual record showing why reliance on a warrant, statute, or court authorization was not objectively reasonable at the time officers acted. That work usually focuses on what information officers had, what they failed to disclose, whether controlling case law had already cast doubt on the legal theory, and whether the scope of the search exceeded what a judicial official approved. Suppression remains possible when the record demonstrates that exclusion would still serve a meaningful deterrent purpose or that the claimed reliance was inconsistent with training, policy, or established law. What happens if the search was illegal but officers relied on a warrant or statute?
Suppression hearings on unlawfully obtained evidence likely will involve moving toward a detailed factual examination rather than an abstract constitutional debate. Courts are likely to evaluate the individual specifics of the fact pattern and legal landscape at the time of the search, the accuracy of information presented to judicial officials, and whether excluding the evidence would meaningfully deter unlawful conduct. Does State v. Rogers change suppression of evidence in North Carolina criminal charges?
What State v. Rogers Means for Suppression Litigation in North Carolina
The October 2025 NC Supreme Court opinion State v. Rogers reframes suppression litigation in North Carolina by applying N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 to permit admission of evidence obtained through a search later determined to be unlawful when law enforcement relied, objectively and reasonably, on external legal authority such as statutes, warrants, or court orders. The decision separates, at least in part, the constitutional violation question from the suppression remedy question and places additional weight on deterrence analysis when officers followed a process that appeared legally valid at the time. The boundary matters. Rogers is about reliance on judicial authorization and legal frameworks, not roadside decision-making or warrantless searches driven by officer judgment without judicial involvement.
For defense counsel, the case pushes suppression hearings closer towards a battle of the facts about reasonableness. The record should address what legal authority existed at the time, what officers knew or should have known, what information was presented to the judicial official, and whether the State’s asserted reliance was objectively reasonable under the specifics of the individual fact pattern. While NC State constitutional arguments under Article I, Section 20 remain available, the remedy discussion now appears more constrained. In practice, the suppression motion may shift from declaring a violation in the abstract to proving why exclusion still matters in the specific setting presented.
With more than thirty years of trial experience in North Carolina, former North Carolina Advocates for Justice President Bill Powers has been honored by the North Carolina State Bar with the James B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award for his contributions to the profession. The defense lawyers at Powers Law Firm are available for consultation on Felony Death by Vehicle, Misdemeanor Death by Vehicle, and Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle matters on a statewide basis. For DUI charges, the firm helps clients in the Charlotte-metro region, including Mecklenburg, Iredell, Union, Gaston, Rowan, and Lincoln Counties.