DUI checkpoints in North Carolina remain constitutional under a January 2026 Court of Appeals decision that clarifies how police must conduct sobriety checkpoints and license checkpoints.
In North Carolina vs White (“State v. White”) the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed that a DWI checkpoint in Robeson County complied with both the Fourth Amendment and N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A, the statute governing police checkpoints in North Carolina.
TL;DR State v. White affirms that an organized license, registration, and insurance checkpoint may pass both the primary-purpose inquiry and the Brown v. Texas reasonableness balancing when the trial court finds advance authorization, a neutral stop pattern stopping every vehicle, supervisor control limiting officer discretion, and visible law-enforcement presence. It also reaffirms that North Carolina appellate courts continue to treat marijuana odor as sufficient for probable cause to search a vehicle, notwithstanding the practical difficulty of distinguishing hemp from marijuana, and it treats the SBI hemp memorandum as nonbinding. The opinion is most vulnerable, analytically, in how it handles the written-policy requirement and how quickly it converts structural checkpoint questions into findings insulated by deference.
For questions about checkpoint stops, suppression motions, or how State v. White may affect your DWI case, Bill Powers is available for legal consultation at Powers Law Firm. Call 704-342-4357 to schedule a confidential consultation. Bill Powers is a trial lawyer with more than three decades of courtroom experience handling criminal defense matters in North Carolina, a past President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice, and a recipient of the James B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award.
DWI Checkpoint Stops in North Carolina | Checkpoint Validity and Probable Cause
North Carolina v. White is a North Carolina Court of Appeals checkpoint and probable-cause opinion that is not doctrinally dramatic, but it is still worth reading closely if you aruge suppression motions.
The Court affirmed two rulings.
First, the checkpoint complied with the Fourth Amendment and N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A.
Second, the odor of marijuana, coupled with what the officer believed to be a marijuana joint, supported probable cause to search the vehicle even after hemp legalization.
The opinion’s real work is not in announcing new law. It is in showing how a minimally complete checkpoint record may be resistant to appellate attack if the trial court enters findings that track the statutory categories.
| Statutory Requirement (N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A) | Evidence Relied On in State v. White | Court of Appeals Treatment |
|---|---|---|
| Written checkpoint policy | GHSP template and checkpoint authorization form | Treated as sufficient adoption based on testimony and documentation |
| Advance supervisory approval | Authorization form signed by chief | Credibility issue resolved by trial court |
| Neutral stopping pattern | Every vehicle stopped | Satisfies discretion-limiting requirement |
| Programmatic purpose | License, registration, insurance checks | Lawful primary purpose |
| Minimal intrusion | Brief stop, visible officers, defined time window | Reasonable under Brown balancing |
State v. White background facts and the suppression issues
The case posture matters because it frames what the Court of Appeals is willing to do.
White arises from a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon after the trial court denied two suppression motions.
The first motion attacked the checkpoint itself as an unlawful seizure. The second motion attacked the vehicle search, arguing that marijuana odor and visual cannabis evidence cannot supply probable cause after hemp legalization because hemp and marijuana can be indistinguishable by sight and smell.
The factual narrative is relatively straightforward and, as written by the Court, unusually clean for the State.
Captain Michael Seago organized a checkpoint on South Old Stage Road in Robeson County on September 11, 2022. The purported purpose was Chapter 20 compliance, predicated on license, registration, and insurance checks. The checkpoint ran for a defined window, about 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., used marked patrol cars with blue lights, and included uniformed officers wearing reflective safety vests. The stop pattern was universal. Every vehicle in both directions was stopped.
When Defendant arrived at approximately 4:24 p.m., he told Captain Seago he did not have a driver’s license. As the officer leaned toward the window, he detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana. The officer asked about the odor, and Defendant produced a partially smoked joint. The officer then directed Defendant to pull to the shoulder. After Defendant exited, the officer asked whether there were drugs or firearms. Defendant admitted there was a firearm in the vehicle and that he was a convicted felon. The vehicle search followed, producing an AR-style rifle under the passenger seat and what the officer believed was unburnt marijuana.
The trial court denied both suppression motions in a written order containing detailed findings and legal conclusions. On appeal, the defendant challenged several findings as unsupported and argued the trial court erred as a matter of law on both checkpoint validity and probable cause.
State v. White holding and what the Court actually decided
The Court of Appeals affirmed across the board and did so through two familiar moves that dominate suppression appeals in North Carolina.
First, it treated the trial court’s findings as the central battlefield. The appellate court repeated the controlling standard. It reviews only whether competent evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. Unchallenged findings bind the defendant on appeal even when evidence conflicts. Credibility determinations remain for the trial court. That framing is not filler. It is outcome-determinative.
Second, the Court organized the checkpoint issue using the two-step checkpoint analysis that has become routine in North Carolina. Step one is primary programmatic purpose. Step two is reasonableness under Brown v. Texas, balancing the public concern served, the degree the seizure advances that interest, and the intrusion on liberty.
On primary purpose, the Court held that a license and registration checkpoint is a lawful programmatic purpose and that the defendant did not present evidence contradicting the State’s stated purpose. It relied on testimony and the authorization materials to conclude the checkpoint’s primary purpose was detecting Chapter 20 violations, which N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A authorizes.
On reasonableness, the Court accepted the trial court’s findings that the checkpoint advanced the public interest, was tailored through advance planning and a defined time window, and limited officer discretion through supervisor control and a universal stop pattern. The Court also accepted the trial court’s findings regarding notice and minimal traffic interference.
On probable cause, the Court reaffirmed the line of cases holding that marijuana odor can provide probable cause to search a vehicle, even after hemp legalization, and it treated the SBI hemp memorandum as legally nonbinding. It placed this case comfortably inside existing precedent by emphasizing additional facts. The officer had extensive claimed training and experience, the odor was strong and burnt, and the defendant produced what the officer believed was a marijuana joint. The defendant did not claim hemp at the scene.
That is the decision. The more useful question for practitioners is what the Court’s reasoning implies about how these issues are litigated, and where the opinion is open to respectful critique.
State v. White critique on written policy and adoption of the GHSP template
N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A requires checkpoints to operate under a written policy that provides guidelines.
The statute also allows the stopping pattern itself to be unwritten so long as no individual officer has discretion over which vehicles are stopped or which drivers are asked for documents. The statute then adds a specific condition when an agency relies on another agency’s policy. If officers operate under another agency’s policy, that must be stated in writing.
White presents a somewhat awkward set of facts for that structure.
The trial court found that, as of the checkpoint date, the Town of Saint Pauls did not have an independent written checkpoint policy but “utilized and adopted” the GHSP template. The Court of Appeals accepted that finding as supported by the authorization form and testimony, then treated it as resolving the statutory requirement.
A careful reader can reasonably ask what “utilized and adopted” means as a matter of statutory compliance.
Using a template as a checklist for a single operation is not necessarily the same thing as having an agency policy that has been adopted, maintained, and applied before litigation begins.
Adoption typically implies a formal act, a decision by leadership, and a stable departmental practice that exists independently of a particular case.
The opinion leaves room to question whether the agency had a preexisting written directive stating that it operates checkpoints pursuant to GHSP guidance, or whether the GHSP template was introduced and characterized as controlling ex post facto and/or after the defense challenged the checkpoint.
The Court’s approach is consistent with the ordinary standard of review.
If the trial court finds adoption and that finding is supported by evidence the appellate court deems competent, the appellate court likely will not reweigh the evidence.
Still, the statutory design is supposed to create a front-end constraint on checkpoint discretion.
When “adoption” is proven primarily through testimony in the very case being litigated, the safeguard becomes thinner than the statute’s text suggests.
One might reasonably conclude that the opinion never squarely explains how the statute’s “another agency’s policy must be stated in writing” requirement is satisfied when the department concedes it had no independent written policy.
The authorization form is a written plan for this checkpoint.
The GHSP template is a written set of suggested procedures.
The statute is not merely asking whether something is written. It is asking whether the checkpoint operated under a written policy and, if relying on an outside policy, whether that reliance was itself stated in writing as a matter of agency governance.
White treats the paperwork for the checkpoint as enough without clarifying whether the reliance was documented as a departmental rule before the stop.
That is not a reason to call the holding wrong.
It is a reason to treat White as a signal that appellate courts may not infer the checkpoint statute demands a high level of institutional documentation unless the record squarely raises the issue and the trial court makes findings that expose the gap.
Advance DWI Checkpoint Authorization
The defense also attacked whether the checkpoint was meaningfully authorized in advance by a non-participating agency head.
The opinion recounts testimony that can be read as clumsy, including language suggesting the officer authorized the checkpoint himself, and the defense raised the appearance that signatures were written by the same hand.
The Court’s response is, to some extent, deferential.
The authorization form existed and contained the chief’s signature. The officer testified that the chief reviewed and signed it. Any contrary evidence went to credibility and weight, which the trial court ordinarily resolves as a matter of law.
While doctrinally consistent, it leaves the reader without practical guidance on what would qualify as insufficient advance authorization.
If the statute is meant to prevent field-created checkpoints, the question is not purely formal.
It is whether the authorization was independent and truly in advance.
White does not offer a developed discussion of what evidence would move this from a credibility dispute into a legal deficiency.
The implication is that, absent a missing form, a date discrepancy, or an admission that no approval occurred, the issue might be treated as a credibility question.
While likely a realistic assessment, it also means that defense counsel who want to litigate authorization would be wise to build a record that goes beyond mere suspicion or inference.
If a cross-examination yields a timeline inconsistency, an inability to identify when approval occurred, or a policy gap in who may authorize, that record might produce a trial court finding that is not easily insulated on appeal.
White is a reminder that appellate courts do not do that work. Trial courts do.
DUI Checkpoint “statistical information” and the checkpoint location finding
The trial court found that statistical information was considered in selecting the checkpoint location.
The Court of Appeals held that testimony about randomly placing the checkpoint pursuant to policy supported that finding. It also noted that N.C.G.S. § 20-16.3A(d) bars randomness challenges as grounds for suppression.
That portion of the opinion illustrates how location selection might be effectively nonjusticiable in many, if not most, checkpoint appeals.
If an officer sets forth that the location was chosen randomly, pursuant to policy, that could be treated as competent evidence that the statutory standard was met.
If a defendant argues randomness was not truly random or not justified, the statute cuts off the argument as a suppression ground.
In practice, the one manner in which location selection might become meaningful is through proof of repeated placement, discriminatory selection, deviation from the plan, or facts supporting a claim that the stated programmatic purpose was pretext.
White does not develop that theme expressly, but it could ultimately function that way.
The opinion appears to treat “statistical information” as satisfied without requiring documentation, a methodology, or evidence that the selection was statistically indicated rather than merely asserted.
It could be problematic if the statutory limitation is converted to a more recital, rather than explain what “considered” means in a way that effectively constrains discretion.
Probable Cause | Hemp vs Marijuana
On probable cause, State v. White is consistent with the current appellate trajectory.
The Court cites decisions holding that the odor of marijuana can establish probable cause to search a vehicle even after hemp legalization.
It emphasizes that probable cause is a practical probability, not certainty, and that the SBI hemp memorandum is not binding law.
If you are looking for a doctrinal shift, you will not find it here. What you do find is a predictable pattern the Court uses to reduce the hemp argument’s force.
The Court notes the officer claimed extensive prior marijuana encounters confirmed by lab analysis.
It highlights that the odor was burnt, not merely a raw cannabis odor.
Of note, the defendant produced a joint after being asked about the odor.
The defendant also did not claim or make reference to hemp.
Those facts allow the Court to treat the fact pattern as more than a bare odor case and to avoid confronting the hard policy question that the defense presses, which is whether the legal indistinguishability of hemp and marijuana should affect probable cause.
White effectively sets forth that North Carolina’s probable cause standard is not a laboratory standard.
The possibility of lawful hemp does not eliminate the probability of unlawful marijuana.
A practitioner critique is that the opinion does not meaningfully engage the practical reality that the SBI memorandum identifies, which is that sight and smell alone may not differentiate legality.
The Court’s answer is that the memorandum has no binding force, and probable cause tolerates uncertainty.
That is legally coherent, but it leaves unresolved tension between evolving substance laws and traditional indicia of criminality.
The opinion is also noteworthy for what it does not need to rely on.
The record includes the defendant’s admission that there was a firearm in the car and that he was a convicted felon.
The Court does not treat that as an independent basis for the vehicle search, and the trial court order did not explicitly rest probable cause on that admission. Put simply, it could have.
The Court further declines to speculate and keeps the analysis anchored to marijuana odor and visual observation.
That restraint is appropriate, but it also, to some extent, reveals the Court’s posture.
It likely will not raise alternative grounds that the trial court did not find, unless unavoidable and legally justiciable under separate legal authority.
Practical takeaways from State v. White for checkpoint suppression litigation in 2026
State v. White reads like a routine affirmance because it is one. That does not mean it is useless. It teaches, by example, what checkpoint records survive and what checkpoint challenges may fail under current North Carolina appellate review.
If you represent a defendant challenging a DWI checkpoint, White serves as a caution that generalized complaints about lack of written policy and lack of statistical selection may not necessarily move the needle unless the record indicates a statutory gap. If the trial court finds adoption of a written template, advance approval, strict supervision, no discretion to deviate, universal stops, visible notice, and minimal traffic interference, that likely will be enough. Once those findings exist, if unchallenged, the appellate court treats them as binding.
State v. White reinforces that checkpoint cases are won or lost in the trial court, based on how the stop is examined, how the record is developed, and how statutory requirements are tested in real time. For defendants facing DWI charges or lawyers evaluating checkpoint suppression issues at the trial level, early analysis of the stop, the paperwork, and the officer testimony can matter. Bill Powers at the Powers Law Firm is a North Carolina trial lawyer with more than three decades of experience handling DWI and Fourth Amendment cases and is a past President of the North Carolina Advocates for Justice and a recipient of the James B. McMillan Distinguished Service Award.